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Introduction
The production of substandard and 
fake drugs is a vast and underreported 
problem, particularly affecting poorer 
countries. It is an important cause of 
unnecessary morbidity, mortality, and 
loss of public conﬁ  dence in medicines 
and health structures. The prevalence 
of counterfeit drugs appears to be 
rising (see “The Scale of the Problem”) 
and has not been opposed by close 
cooperation between drug companies, 
governments, or international 
organizations concerned with trade, 
health, customs and excise, and 
counterfeiting. 
In this article we suggest that many 
pharmaceutical companies and 
governments are reluctant to publicize 
the problem to health staff and the 
public, apparently motivated by the 
belief that the publicity will harm the 
sales of brand-name products in a 
ﬁ  ercely competitive business. Publicly, 
at least, several industry sources say 
the justiﬁ  cation for secrecy is to avoid 
any alarm that could prevent patients 
taking their genuine medicines. 
We argue that this secrecy, and the 
subsequent lack of public health 
warnings, is harming patients and that 
it is also not in the long-term interests 
of the legitimate pharmaceutical 
industry. We urge a change to 
mandatory reporting to governmental 
authorities, which should also have 
a legal duty to investigate, issue 
appropriate public warnings, and share 
information across borders. This is not 
a role for the pharmaceutical industry, 
which has a serious conﬂ  ict of interest. 
While some drug companies have 
given public warnings to protect 
patients, others have been criticized 
for withholding information and, in 
a recent development in the United 
States, taken to court for failing to 
act. The industry is addressing the 
problem. In 2003, US pharmaceutical 
companies made an agreement with 
the US Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) that they would report suspected 
counterfeit drugs to the FDA within ﬁ  ve 
days of discovery (see “Companies That 
Have Warned”), although this remains 
a voluntary arrangement. In many 
poorer countries, where the problem 
is at its worst, there are no similar 
governmental and industry initiatives.
The Scale of the Problem
It has been estimated that up to 15% 
of all sold drugs are fake, and in parts 
of Africa and Asia this ﬁ  gure exceeds 
50% ([1,2,3,4,5,6,7]; R. Jones, FDA 
spokesperson, E-mail statement, 18 
November 2004). The FDA estimates 
that fake drugs comprise approximately 
10% of the global medicine market 
(R. Jones, FDA spokesperson, E-mail 
statement, 18 November 2004). This 
estimate suggests annual criminal 
sales in excess of US$35,000,000,000 
[1,2]. The number of investigations of 
possible counterfeit drugs by the FDA 
has jumped from about ﬁ  ve per year 
in the 1990s to more than 20 per year 
since 2000 (Figure 1). 
Most of the literature on fake 
drugs derives from local investigative 
journalism [6,8,9,10,11,12,13,14], with 
little scientiﬁ  c public health enquiry 
relative to the enormous scale of this 
criminal enterprise. The effects on 
patients of counterfeit medicines are 
difﬁ  cult to detect and quantify, and 
are mostly hidden in public health 
statistics. The estimate of 192,000 
patients killed by fake drugs in China in 
2001 gives an indication of the scale of 
human suffering (see Sidebar). 
Secrecy and Counterfeit Medicines 
Most data on the epidemiology of 
counterfeit drugs are kept secret by 
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Figure 1. The Number of Investigations of 
Possible Counterfeit Drugs by the FDA Has 
Been Rising
(Figure: Margaret Shear, Public Library 
of Science, adapted from [39])PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0303
the pharmaceutical industry and 
by governmental agencies. Drug 
companies employ investigators to 
track down and facilitate the shutting 
down of counterfeit industries, but this 
occurs very much in private. 
There are no reliable accessible 
databases whereby health workers or 
the public can access current details 
of which products are being faked in 
a locality. It is obviously correct that 
information on anti-counterfeiting 
strategies and the sources of 
undercover intelligence should not 
be released, but we believe that the 
information on what drug is being 
counterfeited, and where, should be 
public knowledge [1]. 
Government Reluctance
Governments are also often reluctant to 
publicize problems with the quality of 
the drug supply in their country. This is 
reﬂ  ected in the lack of action in much 
of the world regarding the problem 
of counterfeits, relative to their large 
impact on public health. The World 
Health Organization (WHO) has a 
reporting system and some of the 
information is publicly available [15]. 
The public information, crucially, 
does not include the country or region 
where the fakes were identiﬁ  ed. 
However, the WHO has received no 
reports of counterfeit drugs from 
member countries after 2002, and it 
received only 84 reports between 1999 
and 2002 [16,17]. 
In some countries, government 
ofﬁ  cials have been accused of 
involvement in the false certiﬁ  cation 
of counterfeit drugs, while in others, 
governmental agencies have been 
criticized for suppressing information 
[9,18]. The WHO in the Western 
Paciﬁ  c region, an area severely affected 
by counterfeit drugs, is planning a 
rapid alert system for expediting the 
sharing of warnings and information 
between governments in the region.
Pharmaceutical Industry Survey
We wrote to the Pharmaceutical 
Security Institute (PSI) (see Box 1), 
which collates information on fake 
drugs obtained by the industry, asking 
whether they currently forwarded 
reports of counterfeit drugs to the 
relevant governments and the WHO. 
This question was not answered, 
but the PSI (in a letter dated 29 July 
2003) informed us that, “Since its 
inception, it was recognized that a great 
deal of this information it [the PSI] 
contains would remain conﬁ  dential 
and would not be disseminated. 
There is proprietary information that 
cannot be disclosed, either to peer 
member companies or to the general 
audience. Consequently, at this time 
the dissemination of information…is 
restricted and limited.” The letter 
added that the PSI encourages its 
members to report counterfeiting 
incidents to the appropriate 
authorities, and that it fully supports 
the voluntary reporting to the FDA. 
We also wrote to 21 major companies, 
of the more than 70 pharmaceutical 
companies with ofﬁ  ces in the United 
Kingdom, asking for information on 
the companies’ policies on what action 
should be taken and who should be 
told when one of their products was 
found to be counterfeited. We have 
received replies from six companies; 
one (Merck Sharp and Dohme) 
declined to give any information, 
while three (GlaxoSmithKline [GSK], 
Bristol-Myers Squibb, and Novartis) 
stated that they would inform the local 
drug regulatory authority if they were 
notiﬁ  ed that one of their products was 
being counterfeited. 
Paucity of Warnings about 
Fake Drugs
That many pharmaceutical companies, 
professional organizations, and 
governments, both in developed and 
developing countries are not releasing 
warnings is manifested by the paucity 
of warnings relative to the scale of 
the problem. The industry’s history 
of secrecy over data about fake drugs, 
and claims of a commercial motivation, 
go back over 20 years. In 1982, a 
spokesperson for the Association of the 
British Pharmaceutical Industry said, 
“It is difﬁ  cult to declare a [fake drug] 
problem without damaging legitimate 
business” [13]. This impression of 
secrecy is supported by historical 
statements, such as the following: 
“The Society [Royal Pharmaceutical 
Society of Great Britain] is not issuing 
press releases [about counterfeit 
drugs] because it believes that as 
much as possible should be done 
behind the scenes…and that no great 
publicity should be sought because 
it could damage public conﬁ  dence 
in medicines” [19]. But the Royal 
Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain 
has recently revised its position. David 
Pruce, Director of Practice and Quality 
Improvement for the organization, told 
us (E-mail letter, 14 February 2005), “If 
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Recent Examples 
of Counterfeit Drugs
• Approximately one-third to one-half of 
packets of artesunate tablets, the pivotal, 
life-saving anti-malarial drug, recently 
bought in Southeast Asia were fakes, 
containing no active ingredient at all. 
A nongovernmental organization in a 
Southeast Asian country bought 100,000 
inexpensive “artesunate” tablets only to 
ﬁ  nd that they were counterfeit [7,39]. See 
Figure 2 for examples of fake artesunate 
being sold in mainland Southeast Asia.
• A total of 192,000 Chinese patients are 
reported to have died in 2001 from fake 
drugs, and in the same year Chinese 
authorities “closed 1,300 factories while 
investigating 480,000 cases of counterfeit 
drugs worth 57 million USD” [12]. In 
2004, Chinese authorities arrested 22 
manufacturers of grossly substandard 
infant milk powder and closed three 
factories after the death of over 50 
infants [40].
• In North America, counterfeit 
atorvastatin [41], erythropoietin [41], 
growth hormone [33], ﬁ  lgrastim [33,41], 
gemcitabine [36,37], and paclitaxel 
[36,37] have been reported recently. 
• Nigeria recently threatened to ban the 
import of all drugs from India, a major 
supplier, because of the high prevalence 
of counterfeits amongst the imports [42].
• In Haiti, Nigeria, Bangladesh, India, 
and Argentina, more than 500 patients, 
predominantly children, are known 
to have died from the use of the toxin 
diethylene glycol in the manufacture of 
fake paracetamol syrup [43,44,45]. 
• During the 1995 meningitis epidemic 
in Niger, the authorities received a 
donation of 88,000 Pasteur Merieux 
and SmithKline Beecham vaccines from 
neighbouring Nigeria. The drugs were 
found to be counterfeit, with no traces of 
active product. Some 60,000 people were 
inoculated with the fake vaccines [24].
• The recent discovery of counterfeit 
antiretrovirals (stavudine-lamivudine-
nevirapine and lamivudine-zidovudine) 
in central Africa [46] raises the prospect 
of a disastrous setback in the treatment 
of AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa, unless 
vigorous action is taken now. PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0304
there is a risk that a patient has been 
dispensed a counterfeit medicine, 
then it is vital that they are informed. 
There have been two recent cases 
in Great Britain where counterfeit 
medicines appeared in the legitimate 
pharmacy supply chain. The public 
announcement of the problem of the 
counterfeit medicines was therefore 
entirely proper and necessary.” He 
added, “It is important that news stories 
of this type are handled responsibly 
so that the public’s conﬁ  dence in 
their medicines is not undermined. 
This could deter patients from taking 
genuine medicines.” 
 This assessment, that the dangers 
of causing alarm amongst the general 
public could outweigh the beneﬁ  ts 
of disclosure, remains widespread in 
public statements. A spokesperson 
for the Association of British 
Pharmaceutical Industries, Marjorie 
Syddall, wrote (E-mail letter, 20 
October 2003), “A company should be 
completely satisﬁ  ed that a medicine 
is counterfeit before informing the 
authorities, but more importantly still, 
before it makes this information known 




Chris Jenkins, a founding member 
of the PSI, now Associate Director 
of Pinkerton Consulting and 
Investigations, told us (E-mail 
statement, 9 December 2004), 
“It is necessary to keep fake drug 
information conﬁ  dential for 
commercial reasons…to avoid media 
leaks and to prevent the possibility of 
rival drug companies taking unfair 
commercial advantage of a victim 
company.” He explained, “At the 
outset, we [the PSI] were against 
having data online that anyone could 
interrogate…If a patient came to harm 
as a result of a counterfeit product, 
the company’s good reputation is in 
danger of disappearing, together with 
a loss of conﬁ  dence in the products…
The one thing we were trying very hard 
to do was to keep it [data] out of the 
hands of the commercial people in any 
of the companies…The importance of 
meeting sales’ targets is such that you 
can even ﬁ  nd cut-throat competition 
between different operating divisions of 
the same company, let alone between 
two companies competing in the same 
market with similar drugs.” 
The WHO 1999 guidelines for the 
development of measures to combat 
counterfeit drugs states that “the 
reluctance of the pharmaceutical 
industry, wholesalers and retailers 
to report drug counterfeiting to the 
national drug regulatory authorities 
could impede the national authorities 
from successfully taking measures 
against counterfeiting”, and suggests 
“the compulsory reporting to the 
relevant authorities of any incidents 
in which counterfeits are detected or 
involved” [20]. A recent review of the 
law and counterfeit drugs calls for 
the “eradication of the clandestine 
status of records and counterfeit drug 
information” [21]. At the International 
Conference of Drug Regulatory 
Authorities in Madrid in February 
2004, it was stated by the WHO that 
“the drugs industry had a great deal of 
data but was ‘very reluctant to make 
them available’” [17].
Information Strictly Conﬁ  dential
In the US it was reported that it had 
been “very difﬁ  cult to obtain citable 
factual information about the extent of 
the problem of counterfeit drugs. Drug 
companies keep the information they 
have strictly conﬁ  dential” [22]. In 1989, 
the British Department of Health and 
Glaxo (now a part of GlaxoSmithKline) 
were criticized for not publicizing 
information about the discovery in 
Britain of fake Glaxo Ventolin asthma 
inhalers. London’s The Times obtained 
the fake Ventolin’s licence and batch 
numbers for a story, prompting the 
release of the information. Warning 
letters, drafted by Glaxo and the 
Department of Health, were sent to 
all 14,000 pharmacists in Britain ﬁ  ve 
weeks after the fake’s discovery [8]. 
In 1998, the company Schering do 
Brasil was accused of keeping secret 
the discovery of oral contraceptive pills 
made of wheat ﬂ  our for 30 days while 
they carried out their own investigation 
[23]. According to the Far Eastern 
Economic Review, the company was 
ﬁ  ned US$2.5 million by the Brazilian 
government [6]. Schering do Brasil 
informed us (E-mail letter, 17 February 
2005) that “Federal Justice cancelled 
the ﬁ  ne in 2002 after the company 
appealed”. In Niger, in 1995, one of 
the fake meningitis vaccines originating 
from Nigeria was labelled as made by 
SmithKline Beecham, but Le Monde 
reported that the company did not act 
against the counterfeiters, afraid that it 
might damage trade [24]. 
Fake Paediatric Anti-Malarial 
Drugs
The need to release fake drug 
information is acute in Africa, where 
a resurgence of malaria is killing an 
estimated one million people a year, 
the vast majority of them children 
under ﬁ  ve [25]. One example 
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Figure 2. Genuine and Fake Guilin Pharma Artesunate Blister Pack Holograms Found in Mainland 
Southeast Asia 
(A) is the genuine hologram attached to the blister packs of the genuine Guilin Pharma 
artesunate. The red arrow points to a legend stating “GUILIN PHARMA”, which is 
visible with the naked eye as a thin strip below the waves, but can only be read with a 
microscope (letters are about 0.1 mm high). 
(B) is a fake artesunate blister pack hologram: the upper red ring shows that the 
hologram has crescents, rather than a continuous blank line, between mountain and 
waves, and the lower ring shows that there is no “GUILIN PHARMA” legend. 
(C) is also a fake artesunate blister pack hologram: the red ring shows that the “GUILIN 
PHARMA” legend is present but the letters are of larger font than those on the genuine 
hologram and can be read with the naked eye (letters are about 0.3 mm high).
A warning sheet giving more details and photographs is available in [47]. 
(Photos: Paul Newton, Wellcome Trust SE Asian Tropical Medicine Research Units)PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0305
highlights the problems encountered. 
One of us (K. Agyarko) found 
counterfeits of the GSK paediatric 
anti-malarial syrup halofantrine 
(Halfan) in August 2002 in Ghana. 
That month he prepared a public 
health warning. Agyarko and his 
deputy told the BBC [26] that he also 
alerted GSK’s Ghana agent, who visited 
him with staff from GSK’s London 
headquarters and took away samples 
of the fake Halfan. Agyarko publicly 
stated (on 23 September 2002, at the 
First Global Forum on Pharmaceutical 
Anticounterfeiting in Geneva, 
Switzerland) [26] that he was asked by 
GSK to withhold his public warning 
because it would “damage” their 
product. After his meeting with GSK, 
no warning was issued. In a written 
statement (E-mail letter, 24 October 
2003), GSK denied receiving Agyarko’s 
fake Halfan alert and said the company 
was “not provided with any samples of 
fakes by the authorities in Ghana”.
After a year of enquiries, resulting 
in a BBC Radio programme (BBC 
Radio 4, “File on 4”, 5 October 2004) 
[26], GSK reversed its position and 
said that its local agent had “bumped 
into” Agyarko and had received his 
alert and samples of fake Halfan 
syrup. In a new statement (E-mail 
letter, 5 October 2004) GSK said: “At 
no point was any pressure put on the 
Ghanaian authorities not to issue a 
public warning on fake Halfan.” GSK’s 
vice president of communications, 
Louise A. Dunn, told us (E-mail letter, 
6 October 2004), “There was some 
confusion over the interactions with 
Mr Agyarko. The key point here is that 
there was no wrong doing…” 
However, the Ghana incident needs 
to be viewed in the context of the 
wider illegal trade in fake Halfan syrup 
identiﬁ  ed in West Africa, and GSK’s 
reluctance to give us details about 
this trade. We asked GSK whether 
it had issued any public warnings 
about fake Halfan syrup, but the 
question was not answered. The only 
reference to counterfeit halofantrine 
syrup that we have been able to ﬁ  nd 
in the public domain was published 
in a specialist technical journal that 
described the mass spectroscopy 
analysis of fake halofantrine syrups by 
the GSK Medicines Research Centre 
[27] and demonstrated that the fake 
syrups contained two potentially 
harmful sulphonamide drugs, but 
no halofantrine. We wrote to GSK 
(letter, 20 June 2003) asking when 
and where discoveries of fake Halfan 
were made, and whom GSK had 
informed about them. GSK told us 
only that “counterfeit Halfan is present 
in Nigeria and Sierra Leone” (letter, 
21 July 2003). It gave no details of 
preparation type or discovery dates. 
Fake GSK Halfan syrup was 
discovered in Nigeria in June 2002 
by the Nigerian National Agency for 
Food and Drug Administration and 
Control. NAFDAC alerted GSK and 
issued a public health warning in June 
2002 in the regular NAFDAC fake 
drug bulletin [28], giving the fake 
Halfan syrup’s identifying details. The 
NAFDAC’s Dora Akunyili told BBC 
Radio (5 October 2004): “It is more 
dangerous not to alert the public. We 
will still issue a warning even if we ﬁ  nd 
it in only one shop. If you ﬁ  nd any fake 
drug product in only one shop you can 
be sure it is in many villages…We don’t 
defend companies. We are defending 
the people” [26].
The Pharmaceutical Board of Sierra 
Leone, which handles fake drug 
cases, was not informed by GSK of any 
discoveries of fake GSK Halfan syrup, 
according to its director Michael J. 
Lansana (E-mail letter, 21 January 
2004), although it did receive a report 
of counterfeit adult Halfan caplets from 
GSK. Later, GSK told us (E-mail letter, 
6 October 2004) the fake Halfan syrup 
it had tested was found in Sierra Leone 
in late 2001, and that it had informed 
Sierra Leone’s Minister of Health and 
Sanitation of the ﬁ  nd. 
Only a single report of counterfeit 
halofantrine, which does not specify 
details of preparation type or location, 
is given in the WHO Counterfeit Drug 
Reports for 1999–October 2000 [15]. 
Cross-Border Threats 
and Cooperation
The fake Halfan syrup cases highlight 
the importance of communication 
and cross-border cooperation, and the 
need for industry and governments 
to inform neighbouring countries 
when a fake is found. The global 
distribution and the scale of the racket 
in fake adult Halfan capsules was clear 
in December 2000, when Belgian 
customs seized 57,600 packs of fake 
GSK Halfan capsules (and 4,400 packs 
of fake GSK Ampiclox [ampicillin] 
and 11,000 packs of fake GSK Amoxil 
[amoxicillin]) en route from China to 
Nigeria. The counterfeiters in China 
were found to be preparing to export 
43 tons of 17 brands of drugs from 
seven international pharmaceutical 
companies [29].
Companies That Have Warned
Sometimes pharmaceutical companies 
have publicized information to 
alert health workers and patients 
and governments to the dangers 
of counterfeited or tampered 
products. For example, Johnson and 
Johnson, Serono, Hoechst, Wellcome 
Foundation (now part of GSK), GSK, 
and Genentech have publicized 
information on their drugs that have 
been counterfeited or tampered with. 
In 1982, cyanide-laced paracetamol 
killed seven people in the US. The 
pharmaceutical company whose 
product had been tampered with, 
Johnson and Johnson, issued alerts 
and cooperated with the investigation, 
and although the ﬁ  nancial cost to 
the company was large, its long-term 
reputation was probably enhanced. 
Other companies, at least initially, did 
not take advantage of the disaster for 
their own ﬁ  nancial gain [30]. In 2002, 
Johnson and Johnson issued 200,000 
letters to health-care professionals in 
the US warning them of fake Procrit 
(erythropoetin) within one week of 
being notiﬁ  ed of a severe counterfeit 
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Box 1. The Pharmaceutical 
Security Institute
The PSI is a not-for-proﬁ  t corporation 
formed by the major drug companies 
to collate their fake drug information to 
cooperate in ﬁ  ghting the racket. Based 
in Vienna, Virginia, United States, the PSI 
holds the only known comprehensive 
and updated source of fake drug 
information. The PSI Web site (www.psi-
inc.org) states, “On a daily basis, many 
individuals unknowingly risk death or 
serious injury to their health by taking 
counterfeit pharmaceuticals.” But its 
databank, which health workers see 
as holding key information to prevent 
patients from taking life-threatening 
fakes, is not accessible to the WHO, 
health authorities, or the public. Such is 
the secrecy of the PSI’s information, that 
access is restricted even between its 
member companies, which include the 15 
largest drug manufacturers.PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0306
problem [31]. In 1982, Hoechst 
voluntarily took out magazine adverts 
in Lebanon to warn pharmacists and 
customers of a fake of its drug Daonil 
(glibenclamide) for the treatment 
of diabetes mellitus [13]. In 2001, 
Serono was told by the FDA to issue 
a public warning to hospitals, clinics, 
and patients in seven US states after 
the discovery of a counterfeit of its 
drug Serostim, a human growth 
hormone used in the treatment of 
AIDS and other conditions [32]. In 
1984, in Thailand, the Wellcome 
Foundation (now part of GSK) 
publicized the discovery of fakes of its 
antibiotic Septrin (co-trimoxazole) 
that lacked any active ingredients, 
and the company’s efforts to stop its 
production. Wellcome also had reports 
that the fakes were being imported into 
the UK, which it made public along 
with the warning that it sent to the 
British Embassy in Bangkok [14]. In 
2001, GSK made public the discovery 
of fakes of its AIDS treatment Combivir 
(zidovudine + lamivudine) [32], and 
Genentech publicized information on 
fakes of Neupogen (ﬁ  lgrastim) [33].
The Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America announced 
in April 2003 that, from 1 May 2003, its 
60 members would voluntarily report 
to the FDA “within ﬁ  ve working days of 
determining that there is a reasonable 
basis to believe their product has 
been counterfeited” [34]. This is an 
important local development but 
it should be mandated by law and 
become a global standard. Indeed, 
we have not found one country where 
drug companies have a legal duty to 
report discoveries of counterfeits of 
their products to public health or trade 
authorities. 
The Sharing of Information 
on Counterfeit Medicines 
We suggest that the pharmaceutical 
industry, which is such a beneﬁ  t to 
our health, is harming both patients 
and itself by not vigorously warning 
the public of fake products when they 
arise. Apart from the moral imperative, 
there is the prospect of growing 
legal pressure on drug companies 
to take responsibility for fakes of 
their products. In Britain, there are 
proposals to introduce a charge of 
“corporate killing” for companies 
who have contributed to the deaths of 
customers [35] that could also apply 
to drug companies if they do not take 
reasonable steps to warn the public of a 
fake product. 
Drug Companies Sued in the US
Already, the US has seen the ﬁ  rst 
court case brought against two drug 
companies for allegedly failing to 
act to protect customers over a fake 
drug discovery. In 2002, a Kansas City 
pharmacist was jailed for diluting the 
anticancer drugs Gemzar (gemcitabine) 
and Taxol (paclitaxel). The victims 
and dead patients’ families sued the 
drug companies, Eli Lilly and Myers 
Squibb, for not taking steps to stop 
him. The companies argued that they 
had no duty to protect the plaintiffs 
from the pharmacist’s criminal acts, 
but a newspaper reported that Eli Lilly 
and Myers Squibb settled out of court, 
apparently for US$72 million, avoiding 
a legal precedent that would hold drug 
companies liable for not disseminating 
such information [36,37].
Chris Jenkins suggests that the PSI 
could face a legal challenge to open 
its fake drug databases (E-mail, 9 
December 2004): “Only the PSI had an 
overview of the known 
racket…In theory, every 
fake drug case reported 
by the companies should 
be on there.” He is 
concerned that private 
investigators could be 
liable for fake drug data 
they obtain for client 
companies. 
Governments Must 
Enforce a Legal 
Responsibility
We believe that 
the industry, along 
with pharmacists, 
health workers, and 
governments, needs 
to extend the “behind 
the scenes” ﬁ  ght 
against fakes to a public 
collaborative approach 
with a legal responsibility 
to report suspected 
counterfeits to drug 
regulatory authorities, 
in a similar way to the 
reporting of “notiﬁ  able” 
infectious diseases. 
The drug regulatory 
authorities, accountable 
to the consumers of 
drugs, should have a statutory duty 
to investigate and disseminate the 
information, with the interests of 
patients as the prime concern. Drug 
regulatory authorities in economically 
poor countries will need additional 
ﬁ  nancial support. 
We recognize that false information 
could seriously damage a company and 
that information should be veriﬁ  ed and 
used prudently. We also recognize that 
careful public information measures 
will be needed to prevent patients 
from stopping the use of genuine 
products, but suggest that this is 
possible as pharmaceutical companies 
can, and have, alerted the public 
in collaboration with government 
agencies (see above). However, the 
decision to warn the public should 
not be made by the pharmaceutical 
industry alone, which has a serious 
conﬂ  ict of interest. We believe that the 
long-term interests of both the industry 
and patients are best served by more 
openness and social responsibility 
to public health. Company staff 
and shareholders should not be in 
a position to adjudicate conﬂ  icts 
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between commercial gain and public 
health—such adjudication should be in 
the hands of government departments 
accountable to the public. 
Aviation Industry Model
The UK Civil Aviation Authority 
provides a model: suspected 
unapproved aircraft parts must, by law, 
be reported to it [38]. When a report 
of a counterfeit drug is conﬁ  rmed, the 
drug regulatory authorities should be 
responsible for assessing the public 
health importance of the information 
and deciding when and how to alert 
the country’s police, trade, customs 
authorities, and public, and also the 
drug regulatory authorities of other 
countries that may be affected, with the 
assistance of Interpol as required. If a 
drug regulatory authority is conﬁ  dent, 
for example, that the fake drug has 
been intercepted before it has reached 
the pharmacies, a public alert may 
not be necessary. The “confusion” 
reported in the GSK Halfan syrup case 
also illustrates the great importance 
for both companies and government 
departments to keep a secure paper 
trail of information so that it is clear 
what has happened and when. 
The pharmaceutical company is 
also a victim of the counterfeiter and 
should be supported by governmental 
authorities if it reports promptly. 
Individuals who report information 
on counterfeit drugs should remain 
anonymous and be protected from the 
criminal counterfeiting underworld, 
which may exact retribution. 
International agreements between 
companies to avoid taking advantage 
of competitors’ misfortunes, when 
precipitated by rumors or conﬁ  rmed 
reports of fake drugs, may facilitate 
enhanced cooperation within the 
pharmaceutical industry.
International Convention against 
Counterfeit Drugs
The Madrid meeting in 2004 
considered a proposed international 
framework convention on counterfeit 
drugs, presented by the WHO, to 
promote international cooperation 
and the exchange of information 
[17]. If enacted this could be a very 
important contribution to improving 
drug quality. The effective control of 
the global epidemic of counterfeit 
and substandard drugs will not be 
easy, and will need a multifaceted 
approach: the provision of effective, 
available, and inexpensive drugs; the 
enforcement of drug regulation; more 
openness by governments as to the 
scale of the problem; more effective 
police action against the counterfeiters 
and those who may be corrupt allies 
within government and industry; 
enhanced cooperation between the 
industry, police, customs, and drug 
regulators; and enhanced education 
of patients, drug sellers, and health 
workers [4,5,20]. We urge the industry 
and governments to act, through 
the sharing of crucial public health 
information, to facilitate the protection 
of patients and improve the quality 
of an apparently deteriorating drug 
supply.
Counterfeit Drug Conference 
in Paris
On 15–17 March 2005, the Second 
Global Forum on Pharmaceutical 
Anticounterfeiting will convene in 
Paris, where representatives of the 
major pharmaceutical companies, 
governments, medical and scientiﬁ  c 
professionals, law enforcement 
agencies, nongovermental 
organizations, and private investigators 
will meet to discuss the growing 
problem that threatens patients and the 
pharmaceutical industry (Figure 3).   
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